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Abstract: With a panel-data approach, this paper expands the scope of the financial dollarization literature to 
investigate the determinants of the real interest rate in emerging economies. We found that real interest rates depend 
on the risks of debt dilution and default, expressed by inflation volatility and acceleration, as well as public debt 
size, investment-grade status, and per capita income. As anticipated in an analytical model, the availability of 
dollar-denominated deposits reduces the local-currency real interest rate. The estimated model is used to analyze 
the mystery of Brazil’s high real interest rates. Our empirical model is unable to explain the sky-high level of real 
interest rates in the aftermath of Brazil’s 1994 exchange-rate-based inflation stabilization. However, with the help 
of a proposed Central Bank prudence rule in face of adverse expectations, we argue that, since the adoption in 1999 
of inflation targeting and floating exchange rates, Brazil’s real interest rates are slowly converging to our model’s 
predicted values.  
JEL Classification: E43, F31, O16, O23, O54 
Key words: financial dollarization, interest rates, emerging economies, panel data, Brazil  
 
Resumo: A partir de uma abordagem em painel, este artigo expande o escopo da literatura sobre dolarização 
financeira para investigar os determinantes da taxa real de juros em economias emergentes. Nós encontramos que a 
taxa real de juros depende do risco de diluição de dívida e calote, expresso pela volatilidade e aceleração da 
inflação, assim como o tamanho da dívida pública, a classificação de risco soberano e a renda per capita. Como 
antecipado em um modelo analítico, acessibilidade a depósitos denominados em dólares reduz a taxa de juros em 
moeda local. O modelo estimado é usado para analisar o mistério das altas taxas reais de juros no Brasil. Nosso 
modelo empírico, contudo, é incapaz de explicar as altas taxas reais de juros após 1994. Entretanto, com a ajuda de 
uma regra de prudência proposta para o banco central que enfrenta expectativas adversas, nós argumentamos que, 
desde a adoção do regime de metas de inflação e de taxas de câmbio flutuantes, as taxas reais de juros vem 
convergindo lentamente para valores previstos pelo nosso modelo para as taxas reais de juros.   
Classificação JEL: E43, F31, O16, O23, O54 
Palavras-Chaves: dolarização financeira, taxa de juros, economias emergentes, análise em painel, Brasil.  
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  1I. Introduction 
In a seminal paper on financial contracts and risks in emerging economies, de la Torre and 
Schmukler (2004) argue that dollar contracts at home and in a foreign jurisdiction are rational 
responses of agents trying to cope with high systemic risks. Such risks include interest rate and 
exchange rate volatility, default risk, loss given default due to poor contract enforcement, and 
dilution and confiscation risks. In an environment of high systemic risk, currency mismatches, 
highlighted in the “original sin” hypothesis (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999), can be 
understood as risk-mitigating mechanisms. The original sin hypothesis poses that currency 
mismatches are the result of international market failures that prevent the issuance of local-
currency-denominated bonds abroad. This contrasts with our focus, which emphasizes systemic 
risk as the main culprit for the mismatches.   
  De la Torre and Schmukler explicitly assume that investors are not compensated through 
the return on a given financial contract for risks that are diversifiable by the use of other 
contracts. Thus, for example, if the interest rate on a long-duration local-currency contract does 
not compensate investors for the risk of unexpected changes in inflation, such risk will be 
hedged via, say, a dollar contract. Similarly, if the interest rate on a contract written at home 
does not compensate investors for the confiscation risk, such risk will be diversified away by 
writing the contract in a foreign jurisdiction. 
  This lack of attention to interest rate differentials as part of risk-coping in emerging 
economies is also present in the rapidly growing literature on financial dollarization—defined as 
the use of a stronger foreign currency domestically as a credit instrument and a reserve of 
value.
3 The dominant paradigm in this literature is the so-called minimum variance portfolio 
(MVP) hypothesis, according to which the volatility of returns are key to explaining financial 
dollarization.  In this framework, more often than not the local-currency interest rate is assumed 
to be given by an interest parity condition that is unrelated to the degree of financial 
dollarization. Thus, Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2006, p. 39), although recognizing cases in which  
deviations of the dollarization ratio from MVP allocations are associated to high real domestic 
interest rates, flatly assert that: “…financial dollarization is immune to systematic differences in 
rates of return (through arbitrage, interest rates adjust to equalize ex ante rates of return). 
Instead, financial dollarization is all about risk differences.” 
  Another view of financial dollarization sees the quality of institutions as a key driver of 
contract dollarization (Levy-Yeyati, 2006). There are many ways a poor institutional 
environment may boost dollarization.  When institutional quality is low, the government may be 
unable to assure debt holders that it will not inflate away the real burden of local-currency debt. 
In this case, a credible commitment mechanism may be achieved by issuing dollarized debt 
(Calvo and Guidotti, 1990). On a related interpretation, implicit government guarantees about 
the exchange rate value may generate mispricing of risks and excess dollarization.
  De la Torre 
et al. (2003) argue that government guarantees were an important determinant of the contract 
dollarization during Argentina’s currency board regime, but the argument is also applicable for 
countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes that exhibit “fear of floating” (Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2002).  
  Irrespectively of particular theoretical models, it stands to reason that the same systemic 
risks—price volatility, default, loss-given-default, dilution, and confiscation—that explain 
dollarization should also generate high real local-currency interest rates. To witness, Brazil, 
                                                 
3  Cf. the papers in Armas, Ize, and Levy-Yeyati (2006), plus Barajas and Morales (2003), De La Torre and 
Schmukler (2004), De Nicoló, Honohan, and Ize (2005), Galindo and Leiderman (2005), IADB (2005), Ize and 
Levy-Yeyati (2003), Levy-Yeyati (2006), Reinhart and Nozaki (2006), Rogoff and Savastano (2003). We use 
indifferently the terms ‘dollarization’, ‘financial dollarization’, and ‘deposit dollarization’ to express the same 
empirical concept, namely, the ratio of foreign currency deposits to total banking deposits in a given country. Our 
use of the term ‘dollarization’ should not be associated with the earlier literature on currency substitution, as it in 
fact refers to the phenomenon of asset substitution.  
  2despite its high systemic risks, notably avoided deposit dollarization, and developed a deep local 
financial market almost entirely in domestic currency: short duration is pervasive but what calls 
most attention are the country’s persistently very high real interest rates. It is, therefore, 
somewhat surprising that not a single one of the papers in the empirical dollarization literature 
deals with the local-currency interest rate as an associated dependent variable. 
  One purpose of this paper is to expand the scope of the financial dollarization literature 
to analyze the effect of deposit dollarization on the real interest rate in emerging economies. For 
this endeavor, we make use of the most recently available cross-country multi-year data sets 
developed by international agencies and other researchers (including some of our own). Our 
results, obtained by use of instrumental-variable and panel-data econometric techniques, confirm 
the presumption that systemic risks increase the real interest rate. They also document the 
existence of a trade-off between real interest rates and deposit dollarization – for given systemic 
risks, the more financial dollarization a country has the lower is its local-currency real interest 
rate.  
  Our second objective is to throw some light on the factors behind the mystery of very 
high real interest rates in Brazil, a subject of much dispute in the country
4. In particular, we 
want to determine the role of systemic risks and restrictions to dollarization in the explanation of 
Brazil’s continually high real interest rates even after the adoption of floating exchange rates and 
inflation targeting in early 1999. An additional exercise investigates how much of the post-1999 
excess of Brazil’s actual real interest rate over our panel-based estimation can be attributed to 
the actions of a prudent Central Bank trying to establish the credibility of its brand-new 
inflation-targeting regime.         
  The paper is organized as follows. The following section outlines a simple analytical 
model that demonstrates how systemic risks and the degree of dollarization can affect the real 
local-currency interest rate. Section three describes the data and empirical methods. Section four 
presents and discusses the econometric results. Section five analyzes the Brazilian case. Section 
six concludes. Detail on data sources and procedures are in the appendix.  
 
II. Analytical Model 
This section illustrates in a very simple model the price-quantity trade-offs involved in the 
choice between dollar and local-currency (peso) denominated bonds. Suppose that a 
representative domestic agent can choose from two types of securities: peso bonds, which yield 
a nominal interest rate of iP in pesos; and dollar bonds, which pay a return of iD in dollars. Dollar 
inflation is assumed to be zero. The domestic economy is relatively small, so that the interest 
rate iD can safely be assumed exogenous. The domestic agent values wealth in terms of peso’s 
purchasing power, meaning that he converts any financial resources generated abroad or at home 
into its real value in pesos to infer the implied utility. Let W0 be the domestic agent’s initial 
wealth in real pesos. One period later, his wealth will be given by 
(1)  [ 0 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( W q i i W D D P P ] θ θ π + + + − + = ,         
where π  is the inflation rate and q is the rate of real exchange rate depreciation between periods 
0 and 1; and  P θ  and  D θ  are, respectively, the shares of peso and dollar bonds in domestic 
agent’s portfolio (where, of course,  1 = + D P θ θ ). 
  We assume that the inflation rate and the real exchange rate depreciation rate are 
normally distributed random variables. Furthermore, the representative domestic agent has a 
utility function with constant absolute risk aversion, U(W)=-exp{-  } W γ , where  0 > γ  is the 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The domestic agent’s problem is to choose a portfolio (i.e., 
the value of the share  P θ  or, equivalently, of the share  D θ ) to maximize utility given the 
                                                 
4  Cf. Arida, Bacha, and Lara-Resende (2005); Barcelos-Neto and Portugal (2006); Fraga (2005); Gonçalves, 
Holland, and Spacov (2007); Miranda and Muinhos (2003); Muinhos and Nakane (2006); Salles (forthcoming). 
  3constraint (1). If wealth W1 is normally distributed (which is the case given our assumptions 
about  π  and q ), maximizing the expected value of U(W1)=-exp{-  } 1 W γ  is equivalent to 
maximizing E(W1) - 
2
γ
Var(W1), where E(.) and Var(.) are the expectation and variance 
operators given the information available as of period 0. Using the fact that  1 = + D P θ θ , this 
maximization problem yields the following expression: 
(2)  [ ] [ ] [ ] 0 () () { () (,) PD iE iE q W V a r C o vq πγ π −− −= − π  
[ ] () () 2 (,) } D Var Var q Cov q θπ π −+ +  
To relate the issues addressed in this paper to the “minimum portfolio variance” 
explanation of financial dollarization, we rearrange equation (2), placing 
[ ] () () 2 (,) Var Var q Cov q π ++ π  in evidence, which yields: 
(3)  [ ] [ ] [ ] 0 () () () () 2 (,) PD i E i E q W Var Var q Cov q πγ π −− −= + +π  
[ ] [ ] {( ) ( , ) / ( ) ( ) 2( , ) } D Var Cov q Var Var q Cov q π ππ π ++ + θ −  
 
  Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) demonstrate that the “minimum portfolio variance” share of 
dollar deposits (which we will denominate as MVP) is given by: 
(4)  [ ] [ ] () (,)/ () () 2 (,) MVP Var Cov q Var Var q Cov q ππ π π =+ + +   
Moreover,   
(5)  [ ] () ( ) () 2 (,) Var e Var Var q Cov q ππ =+ +   
where Var(e)  is the variance of the nominal exchange rate. 
Introducing (4) and (5) in (3), we obtain the following simplified relation: 
(6)  [ ] [ ] 0 () () ( ) PD iE iE q W V a r e πγ −− −= {} D MVP θ −  
Equation (6) shows that uncovered interest parity does not hold in our model provided 
that actual dollarization (θD) differs from the minimum variance portfolio dollarization (MVP). 
Instead, there is a risk premium between the ex ante real returns of peso ( ) (π E iP − ) and dollar 
( ) bonds, which is positively related to the minimum variance portfolio dollarization 
(MVP) and negatively related to actual dollarization (θ
) (q E iD −
D).  Therefore, the less dollarized the 
economy is (vis-à-vis “optimum” dollarization given by MVP), the higher will be the 
equilibrium real peso interest rate (vis-à-vis the interest parity rate).  
Equation (6) represents a demand for bonds. Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) close their 
model by postulating a supply side that is the mirror image of the demand side for bonds. We 
choose not to do so and opt instead to treat the currency composition of bond supply as a 
predetermined variable, cognizant of local governments’ importance in its determination, 
through both rules and regulations and public debt composition. Thus, we leave the supply side 
unspecified, and merely ask how the demand-side equilibrium is affected if the available shares 
of peso and dollar bonds change.   
The model’s main message can thus be summarized as follows. If there is no alteration in 
underlying systemic risks, any change in the composition of bonds (quantities) will have effects 
on real interest rates (prices). Thus, for example, a strategy of forcing a “dedollarization”, if it 
doesn’t properly address the fundamental macroeconomic risks of the economy, may only 
transform one problem (vulnerability to exchange rate shifts) into another (high real interest 
rates).   
This framework is used as a generic benchmark for an empirical analysis on the 
determination of real domestic interest rates in emerging market economies, which contemplates 
a series of other systemic risks and policy-related variables, as suggested in the dollarization 
literature and on the debate on Brazil’s high real interest rates.   
  4III. Data and Estimation Methods 
We use equation (6) as a departure point for the analysis of the determination of the real 
domestic-currency interest rate in emerging markets. Besides dollarization, this rate is assumed 
to be a function of systemic risks and policy-related variables that are suggested in the financial 
dollarization literature and in the debate on interest rates in Brazil. See the appendix for sources 
and construction details of each variable. The regressors we consider can be grouped into three 
types: 
  (i) price-dilution risks, captured not only by the minimum variance portfolio variable 
(MVP) previously discussed, but also by a delta-inflation variable (this year’s inflation minus 
last years’ inflation) measuring price acceleration. In the following we will informally refer to 
MVP simply as (relative) inflation volatility. Inflation acceleration on the other hand captures a 
possible inadequacy of our measured real local-currency interest rate (RIR), which subtracts on-
going inflation from the nominal interest rate. Suppose investors are concerned with next-period 
wealth and extrapolate current inflation trends. Then, when inflation accelerates, as a protection 
mechanism investors might demand a higher RIR and a higher dollar deposit share.   
  (ii) sovereign default risks, quantified by the size of the public debt to GDP ratio; by a 
dummy variable indicating whether the country is investment grade or not according to 
Standard&Poor’s
5; and by the country’s per capita income (a variable often used in the 
dollarization literature (e.g., Levy-Yeyati, 2006) as a generic proxy for governance quality).  
  (iii) policy-environment variables, captured by a 0-to-5 scale measuring the degree of 
legal restrictions on onshore dollar deposits; by a 0-to-100 index of capital account liberalization 
constructed by Sebastian Edwards (2005); and by the complement of the World Bank 0-to-100 
“rule-of-law” index
6 -- the later as a proxy to the “jurisdictional uncertainty” concept proposed 
in Arida, Bacha, and Lara-Resende (2005) to capture government-related uncertainties besieging 
financial investors in weak jurisdictions.   
Further to these variables, earlier experiments indicated that the real local-currency 
interest rate was a strongly autoregressive variable, thus, its one-period lagged value was 
included as a further regressor in the equation.   
Our data-set spans from 1996 to 2004 across 66 countries from different parts of the 
world, including emerging market and OECD economies, and therefore we have relatively few 
time-series observations in an unbalanced panel
7.  Table 1 presents basic statistics for the 
variables in the model, indicating their mean, median, maximum and minimum values, and 
standard deviations.   
  We proceed in two steps that are summarized in Graph 1
8. In step I we use the policy-
environment variables to generate an instrument for the deposit dollarization ratio, which 
subsequently enters the equation determining the real interest rate together with the systemic 
risk regressors (step II). The two-step procedure is necessary because the real interest rate and 
the dollarization ratio are jointly determined variables in a supply-and-demand model for local 
currency and dollar bonds, of which our equation (6) is merely its demand side. Thus, the 
dollarization ratio is positively correlated to the error term of the interest rate equation, and, if 
not properly instrumented, its coefficient will be biased toward a positive value. The correction 
                                                 
5 S&P’s specific country-ratings converted into a numerical sequence were also tested with poorer results, which we 
do not report. 
6 Other World Bank institutional quality indicators were tested, with poorer results. 
7 The countries in the sample are as follows: (1) Speculative grade: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, 
El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Mozambique, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, 
Romania, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, and (2) Investment grade: Australia, Austria, 
Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States.  
8 We are indebted to Fernando Velloso for suggesting this econometric procedure. 
  5of this bias requires an appropriate choice of instruments for the dollarization ratio–i.e., 
exogenous variables that are simultaneously not correlated with the error term of the interest rate 
equation and strongly correlated with the dollarization ratio. Fortunately, these instruments are 
at hand in our regressor set, namely, the three policy-environment variables: restrictions-to-
dollarization, degree-of-capital-account-liberalization, and rule-of-law-index.  This is indeed 
how we visualized the “supply side” in our analytical model–it’s given by government 
ordinance. Previous research (Levy-Yeyati, 2006, for example) had already indicated the 
fundamental importance of the restrictions-to-dollarization variable to determine actual 
dollarization. Our results below indicate the complementary relevance of capital account 
controls and rule-of-law. Furthermore, previous research (Gonçalves, Holland, and Spacov 
(2007) and Salles (forthcoming)) also found that at least two of our three policy-related 
variables, namely, capital controls and rule of law, do not belong to the real interest rate 
equation. Our own initial estimations (not reported) indicated that dollarization restrictions do 
not belong there either. 
  Thus, in a first step we generate an instrument for deposit dollarization, which are the 
fitted values of the auxiliary regression:  
(7)  it it it it CAPLIB JU R dollar 3 2 1 0 β β β β + + + =  + ηit, 
where t indexes years and i indexes countries; dollar is the bank deposit dollarization ratio, R is 
the index of restrictions on holdings of foreign currency deposits by residents (developed at the 
IMF and made available in Levy-Yeyati (2006)); JU, or jurisdictional uncertainty, is the 
complement to the World Bank rule-of-law 0-to-100 index; CAPLIB is the 0-to-100 capital 
account liberalization index described in Edwards (2005); and η is the error term. This equation 
was estimated according to a random effect model to generate the instrumental variable for the 
dollarization ratio (D*) subsequently used in the second-step regression for the interest rate 
equation.     
   The general equation for the second-step estimation of the real interest rate (r) is as 
follow: 
(8)  rit =  t γ + i ω +β1rit-1+ β2 D*it  + β3MVPit +β4 ∆πit + β5BBit + β6IGRADEit + β7yit +εit 
 where:  t γ  and  i ω  are respectively the time and country specific effects, D* is the instrument 
for the dollarization ratio, MVP is the minimum variance portfolio (see appendix for more 
details on its construction),  π Δ  is the change in CPI inflation rate, B is fiscal debt to GDP, 
IGRADE is sovereign risk measured by the Standard & Poor’s ratings as captured by a dummy 
variable for the investment grade category, y is per capita income, and ε is the error term.  
  To estimate the real interest rate equation with its one-year lagged value as one of the 
regressors, we adopted the two-step GMM system estimation (level and difference combined, 
GMM-SYS) proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998), based on Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Arellano and Bover (1995). The consistency of GMM estimators depends on whether lagged 
values of the explanatory variables are valid instruments. We addressed this by considering two 
specification tests. The first is a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, which tests the 
overall validity of the instruments
9. The second test examines the null hypothesis that the error 
term is not serially correlated
10. In both tests the model specifications are supported as the null 
hypothesis is not rejected (see Table 3). 
 
                                                 
9 We use the two-step version of the GMM system estimator to obtain the Sargan test statistics, as the one-step 
version of the Sargan test over-rejects the validity of the set of instruments in presence of heteroskedasticity. 
However, it is well known that the Sargan test may have low power in finite sample. To have some indication of the 
power of the test, we estimated the real interest rate equations with its endogenous lagged one year value as an 
additional (but invalid) instrument in the transformed equations. This test overwhelmingly rejects the null 
hypothesis of instrument validity.   
10 Arellano and Bond’s (1991) test of serial correlation suggests that the error terms are white noise. 
  6IV. Empirical Findings 
Statistical results are reported in Tables 2 and 3. Consider initially the results of the 
instrumental regression (7) for the dollarization ratio, in Table 2. All coefficients are significant 
at 5% and R2 is equal to .33. Local restrictions to dollar holdings as expected have by far the 
strongest impact on dollarization -- as they go from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 5, 
dollarization declines by 36.25pp, a figure not very different from the value of the constant term 
in the equation (which means that as restrictions are at a maximum, dollarization is not 
significantly different from zero). Jurisdictional uncertainty as captured by the complement to 
the World Bank 0-to-100 rule-of-law index is also relevant -- as it goes from zero to 100, 
dollarization increases by 25pp. Finally, the 0-to-100 capital liberalization index is also 
significant -- as capital controls are reduced from a maximum of 100 to a minimum of zero, the 
dollarization ratio declines by 9.5pp. 
  The dollarization ratio thus instrumented, denoted by D*, has a significant negative 
impact on the real interest rate, as indicated in the regressions in Table 3. In the following, we 
consider regression (6) of this table, which includes all variables specified in equation (8) of the 
previous section. The coefficient of D* is 0.0011, which means that, as dollarization rises from 
zero to 100, the interest rate declines by 1.1 percentage point (pp) on impact, and by 2.3pp in the 
long run (this last figure is obtained by dividing the impact coefficient by 1 minus .511, and 
multiplying the result by 100, where .511 is the coefficient of the one-year lagged interest rate). 
Interestingly enough, when we substitute actual by instrumented dollarization in the regression 
(not shown), the coefficient of this variable becomes positive (although not significant). This is 
as expected, on the presumption that shocks to the interest rate equation are positively correlated 
to actual dollarization. On the other hand, the policy-environment variables used in the 
instrumental regression have no reason to be correlated to the error term of the interest rate 
equation; hence, by using the instrumental procedure, we’re able to overcome the simultaneous 
equation problem and correctly estimate a negative coefficient for the dollarization ratio, as 
anticipated in the analytical model.  
Our findings also throw quantitative light on the impact of jurisdictional uncertainty 
(measured by rule of law) and capital account controls in the domestic interest rate, as first 
suggested by Arida, Bacha and Resende (2005). We found that these policy-related variables do 
not directly belong to the interest rate equation (this is as in Gonçalves, Holland, and Spacov, 
2007, and in Salles, forthcoming), and also that they have very small indirect impacts on it, 
through their effect on dollarization. These  indirect effects can be calculated by multiplying 
each of these policy-related variables’ coefficients in the dollarization ratio regression by the 
instrumented dollarization ratio’s coefficient in the real interest rate regression. The conclusion 
is that, although significant, the effects of these policy-environment variables on the real interest 
rate are very small.  
Consider now the impact of the price-dilution risk variables on the interest rate. Firstly, 
the real interest rate is positively associated to MVP (loosely interpreted here as the volatility of 
inflation relative to the volatility of the sum of itself with that of the real exchange rate). As this 
inflation-volatility ratio increases from 0 to 1, the real interest rate increases by 0.3pp on impact 
and by 0.6pp in the long run. Contrary to the expectations of the theoretical model, this is much 
smaller than, not equal in absolute value to, 100 times the coefficient of the instrumented 
dollarization ratio, D*–a result that we attribute to the difficulties of properly estimating 
volatility in a panel-based regression (we estimated the volatilities year-by-year for each country 
using 12 monthly observations for the relevant variables). The coefficient of the inflation-
acceleration variable indicates that as yearly inflation increases by, say, 10pp, the real interest 
rate increases by 0.1pp on impact and by 0.2pp in the long run.  
Our three proxies for sovereign-default risk all work very well, indicating that they 
probably capture different aspects of such risk. We consider particularly significant the results 
obtained for IGRADE–i.e., the 1-0 dummy variable indicating whether a country is investment 
  7grade or not according to S&P. Investment grade status reduces the real interest rate by a full 
2pp on impact and by a whooping 4pp in the long run. Per capita income (measured in units of 
1,000 dollars) has also a very strong impact – an increase in per capita income of $1,000 reduces 
the real interest rate by 0.8pp on impact and by 1.6pp in the long run. This effect is probably 
highly nonlinear, fading away for the largest per-capita income figures, but we’re not able to 
capture this nonlinearity either by using a reciprocal transformation of per capita income or its 
squared value. In contrast, the coefficient of the public debt ratio to GDP, although significant, 
turned out to be disappointingly small–a 100pp increase in this variable raises the interest rate 
by a mere .55pp on impact and by 1.1pp in the long run. This might be a consequence of debt 
demand for investment-grade sovereigns being highly elastic, but we’re unable to capture this 
effect with the introduction of a multiplicative IGRADE-times-Y dummy variable in the 
regression. Other possibility is that the proxies we used for public debt for some emerging 
countries are not a good approximation to their true values (see Appendix for a description of 
this variable’s construction).   
 In summary, we have shown that, appropriately instrumented, financial dollarization has 
a significant negative impact on the real interest rate–which indicates that this variable cannot 
remain absent in empirical analysis of financial dollarization as has been the case in the relevant 
literature until now. We also found the real interest rate to be a significantly autoregressive 
variable, indicating the importance of using dynamic panel-data regressions rather than simple 
static regressions to obtain statistically significant results for the estimation of the impact of 
systemic risk variables on the real interest rate. We also established the negative effect on the 
real interest rate of price-dilution risks measured both by inflation volatility and inflation 
acceleration. Public debt impacted positively on the real interest rate but perhaps with a weaker 
effect than we would obtain if our sample could have been appropriately split into investment 
and non-investment grade sovereigns. Investment-grade status and per-capita income were 
shown to have large negative effects on the real interest rate. We could not determine any 
quantitatively relevant direct or indirect effect on the real interest rate of rule of law, capital 
controls, or dollarization restrictions. These variables were however shown to have a significant 
role to play as instruments for the dollarization ratio entering the determination of real interest 
rates. 
 
V. Brazil’s special case 
Brazil offers an interesting case study for our findings. A “serial defaulter” in the terminology of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004b), and second only to Congo in  the magnitude of currency 
depreciation in the 1970-2001 period (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004a), it nonetheless managed to 
avoid financial dollarization and developed a large and sophisticated financial market based 
entirely on its own domestic currency.  Short-duration is pervasive, but what most calls attention 
are the country’s very high real interest rates. Our presumption is that these are interrelated 
phenomena: if systemic risks are high, unusually high real interest rates would be the price to 
pay to escape dollarization and develop a large local-currency-based financial market.  
  Let us first establish a few facts, starting with Brazil being indeed ‘underdollarized’ 
when compared to its peers. This is shown in Graph 2, taken from the 2005 Inter-American 
Development Bank report (IDB, 2005), which depicts deposit dollarization ratios, both domestic 
and off-shore, for Latin American countries in 2001 (the IDB report calculates offshore on the 
basis of deposits by country of origin in BIS-surveyed off-shore banks). With a 10% ratio of 
(fully off-shore) dollar deposits to total onshore and off-shore bank deposits, Brazil is by far the 
country with the lowest dollarization ratio in the region.  Moreover, despite its high systemic 
risks, Brazil managed to develop a large domestic-currency-based financial market, as indicated 
  8for example by the M3 to GDP ratios in the IMF’s IFS database
11. By this measure Brazil has 
the largest financial market in Latin America, comparable in size to those in Europe.  Finally, 
indeed Brazil has very high real interest rates. This is indicated in Graph 3, in which these rates 
are compared with the overall and the sub-investment grade country RIR mean values in our 
sample, and with the sums of such means with one standard deviation. From 1996 to 1999, 
Brazil’s rates are higher than the means-plus-one-standard-deviation limits. Since then, they 
hover around these limits (particularly if we take the electoral transition years of 2002 and 2003 
altogether), but are always much higher than the sample means. 
  Our statistical procedures for the determination of RIRs would seem able to capture 
Brazil’s idiosyncrasies: high inflation volatility, sub-investment grade status, and lack of 
dollarization together with a highly developed local capital market (the latter is captured in our 
regressions by Brazil’s public debt to GDP ratio). Furthermore, Brazil’s capital controls and 
poor jurisdiction (as captured by the WB rule-of-law index) are also present in our empirical 
analysis. How far then are we able to unveil the mystery of Brazil’s very high interest rates?   
To answer this question, we constructed Table 4 on Brazil’s interest and prices. In it we 
added RIR forecasts for 2005 and 2006 to our estimated RIRs in the 1996-2004 period, always 
based on regression (6) of Table 3. The column items are self-explanatory, except for a concept 
discussed below, that of Central Bank’s ‘targeted’ RIR, defined as the minimum between 
estimated and ‘expected’ RIR, where the later results from the deflation of nominal interest rates 
by expected inflation.  
Column (7) of Table 4 exhibits the excess of actual over predicted RIRs–thus 
summarizing our panel-based regression’s power to explain Brazil’s observed real interest rates.  
Graph 4  summarizes the evolution of actual, predicted, and targeted RIRs. To analyze the 
results, consider first predicted RIRs in the 1996-2004 period. Except for two extreme values in 
the neighborhood of 10% during Brazil’s 1998-99 balance of payment crisis, these predicted 
RIRs are surprising stable in the range of 5.5% to 7.5%. The overall (geometric) average is 7.2% 
but, excluding the crisis years of 1998 and 1999, the average is 6.7%. In the 2000-2004 period, 
after exchange rate floating and inflation targeting were adopted, the (geometric) average of 
predicted RIRs is 6.6%. We feel entitled to take this to be the value of Brazil’s “standard” real 
interest rate in the period under consideration.  
Comparing predicted to actual RIRs, we conclude that our empirical model is totally 
unable to replicate the extremely high real interest rates in 1996-99. As Graph 4 illustrates, in 
this period actual RIRs are up to three times as high as predicted RIRs. In the aftermath of the 
exchange-rate based stabilization of 1994, an overvalued exchange rate peg prevailed, in a 
context of successive international financial crises. The exchange rate peg collapsed in early 
1999, which was the first year of a new floating exchange rate regime. In 1999, monetary policy 
was held extremely tight to prevent an inflation blow-out.  Our model fails to capture the 
idiosyncrasies of this early inflation-stabilization period
12.  
We thus center attention on the 2000-06 period, during which a regular inflation-
targeting framework was in force and the exchange rate was allowed to float rather freely. Even 
then, 2002 excepted, actual RIRs are higher than predicted RIRs. Thus part of the mystery of 
Brazil’s very high interest rates remains after our empirical investigation. More specifically, in 
2000-04 the actual RIR geometric mean is 9.4% which compares with a mean predicted RIR of 
6.6% in the same period–actual RIRs are thus on average 40% higher than our panel-based 
estimated values.   
                                                 
11 Several cross-country studies of ‘financial deepening’ (IADB, 2005, for example) fail to capture the extension of 
Brazil’s capital markets because they use as indicators either M2 (which does not include the all-important money-
market Brazilian funds industry) or private bank credit (which fails to capture the important role of bank credit to 
government in Brazil, either directly or through the money-market funds industry).  
12 On Brazil’s 1994 stabilization program, see Bacha (2003); on the country’s subsequent crises and economic 
policy making, see Giavazzi et al. (2005). 
  9Can we at least say that there is a trend toward the convergence of actual to predicted 
RIRs? It is to try to answer this question that we used our regression results to forecast predicted 
RIRs for 2005 and 2006, as shown in the last two lines of Table 4, and the answer is: 
unfortunately not, as the ratios of actual to forecast RIRs in this latter period are even higher 
than in 2000-2004. An important caveat is however in order, and here we introduce our concept 
of Central Bank’s targeted RIR. The Central Bank board members most directly responsible for 
monetary policy in the 2003-06 period have correctly argued in Bevilaqua et al. (2007) that a 
fundamental challenge for monetary policy in this period was to establish Central Bank’s 
inflation fighter reputation in a context of adverse expectations and above-the-target inflation 
rates. Inflation expectations were always higher than actual inflation in 2003-06. Table 4 also 
displays the inflation surge of 2003 that was subsequently contained despite adverse inflationary 
expectations. We thus conceived the following scheme to elicit the targeted RIR of a prudent 
(and all-knowing) Brazilian Central banker in the 2000-06 period: it would fix the nominal 
interest rate according to the following rule: 
Actual nominal interest rate = Targeted real interest rate multiplied by the maximum 
between actual and market-expected inflation rate. 
This essentially says that if the Central Bank ‘knows’ that actual inflation will be higher 
than market expectations, it fixes  the nominal interest rate according to actual inflation (this 
occurred in 2001 and 2002, as seen in Table 4). If however it observes an expected inflation rate 
higher than the actual rate, then (in order to bring inflationary expectations down) it fixes the 
nominal interest rate according to expected inflation (this occurred in 2000 and 2003-06). 
Inverting the terms of the above equation, we constructed a series for targeted RIRs, simply by 
dividing the nominal interest rate by the higher of actual inflation and expected inflation. The 
conclusion of this procedure is that Brazil’s high real interest rate mystery diminishes but is still 
there (except for 2002). On average for 2000-06, targeted RIRs are 28% higher than predicted 
RIRs. Furthermore, we do not observe a trend for this difference to subside through time.  
Should we throw the towel? We not think so. Thus, observe in Graph 4 that the lack of 
convergence is due to two targeted RIR outliers, in 2003 and 2005. The former was the initial 
year of Lula’s left-leaning presidency. It was only natural that Central Bank’s recently-
appointed board would wish to leave no doubt in market-participant minds of their commitment 
to fight an inflation rate that reached 12% in the previous year--hence a very high targeted RIR 
for 2003 is explainable. 2005 is another story. Although there was a temporary inflation surge in 
mid-2004, the Central Bank seems to have overreacted to this surge, as suggested by the well-
below-the-target inflation rate in 2006
13. However, from late-2005 the Central Bank started an 
easing cycle that is still on course. Thus, 2007 and 2008 are our final tests for convergence. 
Market participants in the latest Central Bank surveys (BCB, 2007) anticipate an accumulated 
overnight rate of 11.5% for 2007. They also expect an inflation rate of 3.9% in 2007, thus 
implying a RIR of 7.4%. Better still are the expectations for 2008: an accumulated overnight 
rate of 10.5% and inflation of 4.0%, implying an expected real interest rate of 6.3%. We thus 
conclude that Brazil is finally converging toward a RIR compatible with its fundamentals and 
policy idiosyncrasies--it is still high, but there is no longer a mystery about it.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
One purpose of this paper was to expand the scope of the dollarization literature to analyze the 
systemic risk determinants of the real interest rate in emerging economies. We’re particularly 
interested in investigating the negative relation between deposit dollarization and local-currency 
real interest rates, as anticipated in our simple analytical model. Our findings, obtained with a 
panel of 66 countries in the 1996-2004 period, indicated that, appropriately instrumented, 
deposit dollarization has a negative impact on the real interest rate. This implies that this 
                                                 
13 Target of 4.5% ± 2%; actual inflation of 3.1%. 
  10variable cannot remain absent in empirical analysis of financial dollarization as has been the 
case in the literature until now.  
We found the real interest rate to be a strongly autoregressive variable, indicating the 
importance of using dynamic panel regressions rather than simple static panel regressions to 
obtain statistically significant results for the estimation of the impact of systemic risk variables 
on the real interest rate. We also established the negative effect on the real interest rate of price-
dilution risks measured both by inflation volatility and inflation acceleration. Public debt 
impacted positively on the real interest rate but perhaps with a weaker effect than would obtain 
if we had better quality debt data. Investment-grade status and per-capita income were shown to 
have large negative effects on the real interest rate. Thus, obtaining an investment grade rating 
reduces the real interest rate by 2pp on impact and by a whooping 4pp in the long run. We could 
not determine any substantive direct or indirect effects on the real interest rate of rule of law, 
capital controls, or dollarization restrictions. These policy-environment variables were however 
shown to have a critical role to play as instruments for the dollarization ratio entering the 
determination of real interest rates. 
Brazil is an interesting case study for our findings, because despite high systemic risks it 
managed to avoid financial dollarization and developed a large local-currency-based financial 
market.  Short-duration is pervasive, but what most calls attention are the country’s very high 
real interest rates. We started with the presumption that these phenomena were interrelated: if 
systemic risks are high, high real interest rates are the price to pay to avoid dollarization and 
develop a large local-currency-based financial market. However, we had some surprises on the 
way. First, during the 1996-98 period, when an exchange rate peg prevailed and monetary policy 
was mostly driven by adverse balance of payments considerations, Brazil’s real interest rates 
proved to be up to three times as high as our panel-based estimates.  
We thus centered attention on the 2000-06 period, during which a regular inflation-
targeting framework was in force and the exchange rate was allowed to float. Even then, 2002 
excepted, we found actual real interest rates to be much higher than predicted, thus part of the 
mystery of Brazil’s very high interest rates seemed to remain even after our empirical 
investigation. Allowing for the fact that in 2003-06 the Central Bank under Lula had to establish 
its reputation as an inflation fighter, we devised an exercise incorporating adverse expectations 
and Central Bank prudence in our estimates, thus being able to reduce Brazil’s high real interest 
rate mystery to less than we initially estimated. Although we did not discern a clear trend for the 
remaining disparity between observed and predicted rates to diminish after 1999, we observed 
that this lack of convergence was due to two outliers, namely 2003 and 2005. Making use of 
market-based expectations for 2007 and 2008, we finally concluded that Brazil’s real interest 
rates are in the process of converging to our model’s standard RIR for the country, which is 
6.6%.    
A weak spot in our analysis is that our sample is very limited in the time dimension. 
Future research should thus endeavor to uncover dynamic relations not contemplated by our 
results. In this context, much additional effort on the part of the international organizations is 
badly needed to provide comparable fiscal and monetary data for a larger number of countries 
and years. Finally, we only considered two of the possible financial consequences of systemic 
risk, i.e., domestic financial dollarization and high real interest rates.  Further research effort is 
required to incorporate offshore dollarization, short-termism, indexation, and financial 
shallowness as alternative systemic-risk-coping mechanisms in emerging economies in general, 
and Brazil in particular. 


















































 Mean   68.75   57.35   18.63  -1.40   9,129.31   9.07   12.67   35.58   0.45   3.50   8.06   0.59 
 Median   62.50   53.84   9.25  -0.37   4,366.51   5.19   7.68   33.00   0.45   3.07   7.00   0.00 
 Maximum   100.00   149.00  88.40   58.06   37,164.60   85.74   91.95   86.10   1.15   66.15   16.00  5.00 
 Minimum   37.50   5.86   0.00  -64.96   752.33  -0.84   0.11   0.00   1.43E-07  -38.19   0.00   0.00 
 Std. Dev.   21.12   27.11  21.98   9.65   9,931.15   14.00   15.00   23.92   0.34  6.34   4.48   1.29 
Sources: World Bank, WDI on line; World Bank, Governance Indicators; IMF, IFS on line; Edwards (2005); Levy-Yeyati (2005), Standard & Poor´s (2005). Authors´ calculations. 
Notes: The Capital Account Liberalization Index has a scale from 0 to 100, where a higher number denotes a higher degree of capital mobility; Dollarization Index is the deposit dollarization to 
the total deposits ratio and ranges from 0 to 100%; Sovereign Ratings is provided by Standard & Poor’s and the rating scales were converted to assigned values from 0 to 16, where from 0 to 6 
are speculative grades and from 7 to 16, investment grades; Restrictions has a scale from 0 to 5, where a higher number denotes more restriction on residents’ holdings of foreign currency 
deposits.  
  
Table  2 – Econometric Results – First-Step Estimate - Reduced Form  
Dependent Variable: Dollarization Index (DOLLAR)   (1996-2004) 
MODELS  1  2  3 


















CAPLIB     -  0.095** 
(0.04) 
       
R2 
No. of Countries 










Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%.  Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
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  GMM-SYS - Blundell and Bond (1998) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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       -0.0008* 
(0.0005) 
             
No. of countries 
No. of parameters 
No. of observations 
Specification Tests (p value) 
    Sargan Test  
    First-Order Serial Correlation 











































Notes: * indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 10% level, and ** significant at 5% level. 
Standard errors and tests are based on the robust variance matrix. Wald (joint) tests the significance on all regressors except dummies; Wald (dummy) tests the significance on 
all dummies, Wald (time) the significance of the time dummies and the constant. The tests for 1
st and 2
nd order serial correlation are asymptotically distributed as standard 
normal variables (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The p-values report the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial correlation, where the first differencing will 
induce (MA1) serial correlation if the time-varying component of the error term in level is serially uncorrelated disturbance. The AR (2) test is listed as  in Arellano and 
Bond (1991). Windmeijer (2000) derives a small-sample correction which is implemented here.  
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  13 Table 4:  Interest and Prices (%)  1996-2006 
Year  Nominal   Actual  Expected  Predicted  Actual  Targeted  Excess  Excess 
  Interest  CPI  CPI  RIR  RIR  RIR  Actual/  Targeted/ 
  Rates  Inflation  Inflation        Predicted  Predicted 
  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8] 
1996 27,41  9,56  n.a  5.45  16,3  n.a  10.3  n.a 
1997 24,79  5,22  n.a  7.56  18,6  n.a  10.2  n.a 
1998 28,79  1,66  n.a  10.21  26,7  n.a  14.9  n.a 
1999 25,59  8,94  n.a.  9.02  15,3  n.a  5.8  n.a 
2000  17.43  5.97  7.00  7.11  10.8  9.7 3.5 2.5 
2001  17.32  7.67  4.30  6.88  9.0  9.0 1.9 1.9 
2002 19.17  12.53  4.80  7.41  5.9  5.9  (1.4)  (1.4) 
2003  23.35  9.30  12.56  6.21  12.9  9.6 6.3 3.2 
2004  16.25  7.60  9.22  5.28  8.0  6.4 2.6 1.1 
2005 19.05  5.69  7.47  6.65  12.6  10.8  5.6  3.9 
2006  15.08  3.14  5.68  7.05  11.6  8.9 4.2 1.7 
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil and Authors’ Calculations. 
 Graph 1 – Two-step Empirical Strategy 
POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
Restrictions to dollarization, 
Capital controls, Rule of Law (JU)
SYSTEMIC RISKS 
(Inflation volatility, inflation acceleration, 
Government debt, S&P Ratings, 









  14 Graph 2 – Onshore and Offshore Deposit Dollarization in Latin America (2001) 
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APPENDIX 
DATA SOURCES AND PROCEDURES 
Real Interest Rate  (RIR) – Ratio of one plus the average of the annualized end-of-month 
money-market interest rate in IFS (line 60B, ZF) to one plus the average of the annualized 
monthly consumer price index variation (IFS, line CPI), minus one, in percentage terms. 
 
Dollarization Ratio (Dollar) – Ratio of Dollar (or Euro) deposits over total bank deposits. 
Source is Levy-Yeyati (2006). Original sources: IMF Staff Reports, Central Bank bulletins, 
Bolino et al. (1999), De Nicoló et al. (2003), and Arteta (2003). 
 
Delta-inflation ( π Δ ) – Absolute-value difference between this year’s and last year’s inflation, 
both calculated as the average of the annualized monthly consumer price index variation (IFS, 
line CPI), in percentage terms. 
 
Public Debt to GDP Ratio (B) – Ratio of the consolidated public sector debt to GDP, in 
percentage terms, from Callen et al. (2003)’s data set and Central Banks. For approximately 
30% of the sample, all developing countries, this data is not available and was proxied on the 
basis of a panel regression of debt-to-GDP to PPGD-to-GDP (public and publicly guarantee 
debt service to GDP from World Bank, Global Development Finance on line). With this 
regression, an estimate was constructed for the missing debt-to-GDP ratios on the basis of the 
countries’ PPGD-to-GDP ratios. Regression results and estimates available from the authors. 
 
Investment Grade (IGRADE) – Equal to 1 for a sovereign investment-grade rating and zero 
for a speculative-grade ratio. This variable was maintained constant for each country on the 
basis of its status in 2004. Source: Standard & Poor’s. 
 
Jurisdictional Uncertainty (JU) – Equal to 100 minus the World Bank rule-of-law index 
ranging from 0 to 100. As we had values for this variable only for even years, odd-years values 
were assumed equal to the immediately preceding even-values. Source: World Bank, 
Governance Indicators. 
 
Capital account liberalization index (CAPLIB) – Index described in Edwards’ (2005), gently 
provided to us by the author. It is a scale from zero to 100 in which higher values indicate 
increasing degrees of capital account liberalization. 
 
Per Capita GDP (Y) – This is in constant 2000 US dollars. Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
 
Restrictions (R) – Index of restrictions on holdings of foreign currency deposits by residents, 
ranging from zero (no restrictions) to 5 (maximum restrictions). Source: Levy-Yeyati (2005). 
Original sources: IMF´s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(EAERR), revised and expanded by Levy-Yeyati from De Nicoló et al. (2003) using the same 
methodology.  
 
Minimum Variance Portfolio (MVP) - This is derived from a portfolio choice model, in which 
risk-averse local investors opt between a local-currency-denominated and a dollar-denominated 
asset. As shown in Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003), if the uncovered interest-parity condition holds, 
the dollar share of the optimal investment portfolio, which replicates the minimum variance 
portfolio, is equal to MVP = [ ] [ ] () (,) / () ( ) 2 (,) Var Cov s Var Var s Cov s ππ π π ++ + , where 
π  is the inflation rate in local currency and   is the real exchange rate. To estimate a country’s 
MVP for year t, we used monthly data on inflation (CPI) and nominal exchange rate changes for 
that country in year t. Source: IMF’s IFS on line.  
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